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Abstract
We introduce a new class of rules for resolving quasilinear social choice problems.
These rules extend those of Green [7]. We call such rules multi-utilitarian rules. Each
multi-utilitarian rule is associated with a probability measure over the set of weighted
utilitarian rules, and is derived as the expectation of this probability. These rules are
characterized by the axioms eﬃciency, translation invariance, monotonicity, continuity,
and additivity. By adding recursive invariance, we obtain a class of asymmetric rules
generalizing those Green characterizes. A multi-utilitarian rule satisfying strong mono-
tonicity has an associated probability measure with full support.
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1 Introduction
Building on the foundational work of Green [6, 7], this paper studies a social choice
model where agents can make transfers among themselves. Imagine two agents who
must decide on some social alternative. There is an infinitely divisible good, and agents
have preferences which are quasilinear over the social alternative and good. The question
is which alternative should be chosen, and which transfers should be recommended? We
take a normative approach to this problem.
We imagine that randomization over social alternatives is permitted, and that all
agents are expected utility maximizers. Moreover, we assume that agents are risk-
neutral in the infinitely divisible good. Under these assumptions, we may uniquely (up
to translation) represent each agent’s preference by a utility function which is additively
separable in the infinitely divisible good, taking the form U (p, x) = u (p) + x.
We do not work with the underlying space of alternatives. Instead, the primitive of
the model is the utility possibility set that agents can achieve without making transfers.
Thus, the theory is “welfarist,” at least in terms of the social alternatives. Any two
scenarios which induce the same utility possibility set before transfers are identified.
This utility possibility set is referred to as a “problem.” For any given problem, a rule
specifies a pair of utilities for the agents. We assume this pair of utilities is achievable
through transfers.
We discuss properties that rules for solving such problems should satisfy. Minimally,
we require that a rule select eﬃcient utility pairs. However; we ask that a rule satisfies
several other properties. One such requirement is tied to the underlying utility repre-
sentation. The utility representation derived for any given preference relation is almost
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unique. However, by adding a constant to a given utility representation, we obtain a
new utility representation for a preference which is equally as valid as the first. We
will require that a rule is robust to utility specification. Translation invariance states
that the addition of a constant vector to a problem (equivalent to adding a constant to
each agent’s utility function) should induce an equivalent addition of this vector to its
solution.
Suppose that a problem is altered, so that alternatives are added which “favor” agent
1, and some alternatives which “favor” agent 2 are removed. How should the solution
respond to such a change? As the scenario becomes more favorable toward agent 1, a
natural requirement is that the solution should not make agent 1 worse oﬀ. This is the
axiom of monotonicity.
We further require that the solution to a problem should vary continuously with the
problem itself. A rule is continuous if it is continuous with respect to the Hausdorﬀ
topology appropriately defined for this model.
Our last axiom states that given two problems, if we know the solution recommended
by the rule for each problem, then we can compute the solution for the Minkowski sum
of the two problems as the sum of the solutions of the original problems. This axiom is
called additivity.
Green [7] investigates the implications of all of the axioms we have discussed, in
addition to two other axioms. One of his other axioms is a basic symmetry condition.
His other axiom, recursive invariance, is motivated as follows. Suppose a utility pair is
selected by a rule for a given problem. Suppose this utility pair is added to the problem,
resulting in a modified problem. The rule applied to the modified problem should again
select this utility pair. Green characterizes the family of all rules satisfying his axioms.
Our result is more general than his, but the rules we characterize share several important
characteristics with the rules he characterizes.
Our main result is a characterization of the family of rules satisfying the axioms eﬃ-
ciency, translation invariance, monotonicity, continuity, and additivity. To understand
how these rules work, we first discuss the concept of weighted utilitarianism. A weighted
utilitarian rule is a rule in which each agent is assigned a nonnegative weight; at least
one of which is positive. The agents’ weights are not the same. A natural social wel-
fare function over utility space is that which computes the weighted sum of the agents’
utilities. A weighted utilitarian rule then works as follows: find the utility pair lying in
the problem which induces the maximal social utility. When transfers are possible, this
pair is not necessarily eﬃcient. However, there is a remedy for this ineﬃciency. There
exists a unique eﬃcient utility pair (i.e. after transfers) whose social utility is the same
as the original utility pair. The weighted utilitarian rule selects this eﬃcient utility pair.
The class of rules satisfying our five axioms is convex. This leads us to a natural
conjecture. Suppose we have given a probability distribution over the weighted utilitarian
rules. For any given problem, we can compute the expected solution according to this
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distribution. This expected solution is itself a utility pair; thus, we can naturally identify
a rule with the probability distribution. Such a rule will be called a “multi-utilitarian
rule.” Our main contribution is to show that the multi-utilitarian rules are the only rules
satisfying the five properties.
Another result that we discuss concerns a weakening of additivity. Suppose that we
require that the solution for the “average” of two problems is the average of the solutions.
This condition is called mixture linearity, and it plays a fundamental role in the work of
Myerson [8]. Mixture linearity is a requirement that precludes a rule from depending
on when certain decisions are made. Suppose that a fair coin is tossed to decide which
of two problems is to be faced. Mixture linearity requires that the ex-ante expected
payoﬀs to agents do not depend on whether or not the rule is applied before or after the
coin toss. We characterize the class of rules satisfying eﬃciency, translation invariance,
monotonicity, continuity, and mixture linearity. These rules are multi-utilitarian rules
in which an additional exogenous transfer is made between the agents.
Green’s rules are multi-utilitarian rules which feature a probability measure placing
positive probability on exactly two weighted utilitarian rules. The two weighted utilitar-
ian rules are symmetric of each other, and have a probability of one-half. We characterize
all the multi-utilitarian rules satisfying recursive invariance. We do not require sym-
metry. A multi-utilitarian rule satisfying recursive invariance places probability on at
most two weighted utilitarian rules—one of which favors agent 1, and the other of which
favors agent 2. The weighted utilitarian rules need not be symmetric of each other, and
they need not be given equal probability. We call such a rule a “bi-utilitarian rule.” It
is obvious that by adding symmetry, we obtain Green’s rules.
In order to establish that our generalization is useful, we discuss the axiom of strong
monotonicity. This axiom states that as a problem becomes more favorable toward
agent 1, then the solution should become more favorable toward agent 1. None of the
multi-utilitarian rules satisfying recursive invariance satisfy strong monotonicity. The
class of all multi-utilitarian rules satisfying strong monotonicity is characterized as the
set of multi-utilitarian rules whose associated probability measure has full support—what
we call a “full multi-utilitarian rule.”
Section 2 introduces the formal model. Section 3 includes the main results and
proofs. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Preliminaries
Let N ≡ {1, 2} be a set of agents. Say that a subset B ⊂R2 is bounded above if
there exists some x ∈ R2 such that B ⊂ {y : y1 ≤ x1 and y2 ≤ x2}. A problem is a
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BH(B)
Figure 1: A problem
nonempty subset of R2 which is closed, convex, comprehensive, and bounded above. By
B, we mean the set of all problems.
Let x : B → R be defined as x (B) ≡ maxx∈B x1 + x2. We say x is a solution to a
problem B if x1+x2 ≤ x (B). Let H be a function defined on the set of problems which
maps to the set of hyperplanes of R2. Specifically, let H (B) be defined as H (B) ≡
{x ∈ R2 : x1 + x2 = x (B)}. Thus, H (B) is the set of eﬃcient points that the agents
can achieve by making transfers. Figure 1 illustrates a typical problem.
A rule is a function f : B → R2 such that for all B ∈ B, f (B) is a solution for
B. We could conceivably generalize the class of rules to be multi-valued, but for our
purposes, single-valued rules will suﬃce.
2.2 Properties of rules
We discuss several normative properties that rules may satisfy. The first is the standard
concept of eﬃciency.
Eﬃciency: For all B ∈ B, f (B) ∈ H (B).
Our next property is to be interpreted as robustness of the rule to the underlying
utility specification. Formally, any two problems B,B0 ∈ B such that B0 = B + x for
some x ∈ R2 can be viewed as arising from the same underlying preferences. Hence, a
rule should recommend the same social alternative and transfers in the new problem as
in the old problem. But the utility value induced by this solution for the new problem
is simply the old utility value, translated by x.
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A
Figure 2: The problem A dominates the problem B for agent 1
Translation invariance: For all B ∈ B and all x ∈ R2, f (B + x) = f (B) + x.
Our next property states that for problems which are the convex and comprehensive
hull of singletons, the rule should select that singleton. This axiom is extremely weak
and should be interpreted as saying that when there is a single feasible action, this action
should be chosen and transfers should not be made.
Formally, K is a mapping which takes each set into its convex, comprehensive hull.
Selection of singletons: Let x ∈ R2. Then f (K ({x})) = x.
Suppose that we are given two problems B,B0 ∈ B. Say that B0 dominates B for
agent 1 if H (B) = H (B0) and the following two conditions are satisfied:
B ∩ {x ∈ R+ : x1 ≥ sup {x1 : x ∈ B0 ∩H (B0)}}
⊂ B0 ∩ {x ∈ R+ : x1 ≥ sup {x1 : x ∈ B0 ∩H (B0)}}
and
B0 ∩ {x ∈ R+ : x2 ≥ sup {x2 : x ∈ B ∩H (B)}}
⊂ B ∩ {x ∈ R+ : x2 ≥ sup {x2 : x ∈ B ∩H (B)}} .
A problem B0 dominates B for agent 1 if B0 gives agent 1 “better possibilities” than B.
We could also define a notion of B0 dominating B for agent 2; the definition is symmetric.
Figure 2 illustrates a scenario in which A dominates the set B for agent 1.
We formulate this condition of domination so that we may discuss a simple mono-
tonicity condition. Thus, imagine B0 dominates B for agent 1; then it is reasonable to
require that agent 1 should benefit from this domination.
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Monotonicity: Let B,B0 ∈ B and suppose that B0 dominates B for agent 1. Then
f1 (B) ≤ f1 (B0).
Monotonicity could also be described using the language of set domination for agent
2; such variants are equivalent under eﬃciency. Green [7] introduces monotonicity;
although his version is weaker.
The next property states that if two problems are “close,” then their solutions should
be “close.” In order to define this, we first define the Hausdorﬀ extended metric on
the space C of closed subsets of R2.1 Let d : R2 × R2 be the Euclidean metric. Define
the distance d∗ : R2 × C → R+ as
d∗ (x,B) ≡ inf
y∈B
d (x, y) .
Finally, the Hausdorﬀ extended metric, dHaus : C × C → R+ ∪ {∞}, is defined as
dHaus (B,B
0) ≡ max
½
sup
x∈B0
d∗ (x,B) , sup
x∈B
d∗ (x,B0)
¾
.
We verify that dHaus is a metric when restricted to B.2
Proposition 1: The function dHaus is a metric when restricted to B.
Proof: By Lemma 3.57 of Aliprantis and Border, we know that dHaus is an extended
metric. Thus, we only need establish that for all B,B0 ∈ B, dHaus (B,B0) < ∞. Let
B,B0 ∈ B. Let y (B) ≡ (supx∈B x1, supx∈B x2) and y (B0) ≡ (supx∈B0 x1, supx∈B0 x2).
We claim that B∩B0 6= ∅. Thus, let xB ∈ B and let xB0 ∈ B0. Then xB∧xB0 ∈ B∩B0,
as xB ∧ xB0 ≤ xB,xB0 , and by comprehensivity of B and B0.3
Thus, let x∗ ∈ B ∩ B0. For all x ≤ x∗, x ∈ B ∩ B0, and hence d∗ (x,B) = 0 and
d∗ (x,B0) = 0.
We claim that there exists c1 > 0 such that for all x ∈ B such that x1 ≥ x∗1 and
x2 ≤ x∗2, d (x,B0) ≤ c1. Thus, let x ∈ B satisfy the hypotheses. Set c1 ≡ y1 (B)− x∗1 >
0. Then x1 ≤ y1 (B). Moreover, (x∗1, x2) ∈ B0 by comprehensivity of B0, so that
d ((x1, x2) , (x
∗
1, x2)) = x1 − x∗1 ≤ c1.
A similar argument establishes that there exists c2 such that for all x ∈ B0 such that
x1 ≥ x∗1 and x2 ≤ x∗2, d∗ (x,B) ≤ c2. Moreover, there exists c3 such that for all x ∈ B
1For d to be an extended metric, the following must be true:
i) For all B,B0 ∈ K, d (B,B0) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if B = B0
ii) For all B,B0 ∈ K, d (B,B0) = d (B0, B)
iii) For all A,B,C ∈ K, d (A,C) ≤ d (A,B) + d (B,C).
The function d is a metric if it only takes real values.
2We slightly abuse notation by referring to dHaus on B as dHaus, when it should really be written
dHaus|B.
3Here, ‘∧’ refers to the meet of two elements, or the pointwise infimum.
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such that x2 ≥ x∗2 and x1 ≤ x∗1, d∗ (x,B0) ≤ c3. Finally, there exists c4 such that for all
x ∈ B0 such that x2 ≥ x∗2 and x1 ≤ x∗1, d∗ (x,B) ≤ c4.
Lastly, A ≡ {x ∈ B : x ≥ x∗} and A0 ≡ {x ∈ B0 : x ≥ x∗} are compact sets; hence,
dHaus (A,A
0) < ∞. By checking the various regions of B and B0, it is readily verified
that
dHaus (B,B
0) ≤ max
½
c1, c2, c3, c4,max
x∈A
d∗ (x,B0) ,max
x∈A0
d∗ (x,B)
¾
,
which is in turn less than or equal to max {c1, c2, c3, c4,maxx∈A d (x,A0) ,maxx∈A0 d (x,A)} <
∞.
The space B is endowed with the topology generated by dHaus. Our next requirement
is that a rule is continuous in this topology, called the Hausdorﬀ topology.
Continuity: The rule f is continuous in the Hausdorﬀ topology.
Continuity is a property which is very restrictive in this model. As a natural example
of a rule satisfying all of our axioms except for continuity, let f the rule which selects
the midpoint of the optimal eﬃcient point for agent 1 and the optimal eﬃcient point for
agent 2.
Lastly, we discuss additivity. For all A,B ∈ B, define A + B ≡
{x+ y : x ∈ A, y ∈ B}.4 Note that A + B ∈ B. Most authors view additivity as a
condition which states that a rule is invariant under the sequencing of when problems
are faced.
Additivity: For all A,B ∈ B, f (A+B) = f (A) + f (B).
Under very mild conditions, additivity is equivalent to the following weaker condition.
We use the additivity condition so that the parallels between our work and Green’s work
are clear.
Mixture linearity: For all A,B ∈ B, f ¡A+B
2
¢
= f(A)+f(B)
2
.
Mixture linearity is the requirement that a rule should be invariant to “timing eﬀects.”
Suppose that the two problems A and B are faced with equal probabilities. Such a
scenario induces a natural utility possibility set; A+B
2
. Applying the rule at this ex-ante
stage results in a solution of f
¡
A+B
2
¢
. Waiting until after the randomization to solve the
problem results in an ex-ante expected solution of f(A)+f(B)
2
. Mixture linearity requires
that there is no ex-ante benefit to either agent from either procedure.
4The operator ‘+’ is referred to as the Minkowski sum.
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Proposition 2: If a rule f satisfies f (K ({0})) = 0, then it satisfies additivity if and
only if it satisfies mixture linearity.
Proof: Let f be a rule satisfying f (K ({0})) = 0. Suppose that f satisfies
additivity. Let A,B ∈ B. We will show that f ¡A+B
2
¢
= f(A)+f(B)
2
. By addi-
tivity, f
¡
A+B
2
¢
+ f
¡
A+B
2
¢
= f (A+B). By additivity, f (A+B) = f (A) + f (B).
Thus, f
¡
A+B
2
¢
= f(A)+f(B)
2
. Conversely, suppose that f satisfies mixture linearity.
Let A,B ∈ B. We will show that f (A+B) = f (A) + f (B). Thus, f ¡A+B
2
¢
=
f
³
(A+B)
2
+ K({0})
2
´
. By mixture linearity, f
³
(A+B)
2
+ K({0})
2
´
= f(A+B)+f(K({0}))
2
. By as-
sumption, f(A+B)+f(K({0}))
2
= f(A+B)
2
. By mixture linearity, f
¡
A+B
2
¢
= f(A)+f(B)
2
. Hence,
f(A+B)
2
= f(A)+f(B)
2
, so that f (A+B) = f (A) + f (B).
We establish another connection between our axioms which will be useful for the proof
of the main result.
Proposition 3: If a rule satisfies additivity, then it satisfies translation invariance if and
only if it satisfies selection of singletons.
Proof: Suppose f is additive, and that it satisfies translation invariance. Let
x ∈ R2. Then, by additivity, f (2K ({0})) = 2f (K ({0})). But by definition, 2K ({0}) =
K ({0}). Thus, f (K ({0})) = 2f (K ({0})), so that f (K ({0})) = 0. Thus, f (K ({x})) =
f (K ({0}) + x). By translation invariance, f (K ({0}) + x) = f (K ({0})) + x. By the
preceding statement, f (K ({0})) + x = x, so that f (K ({x})) = x.
Next, suppose that f satisfies selection of singletons. Then for all B ∈ B and all x ∈
R2, f (B + x) = f (B +K ({x})). By additivity, f (B +K ({x})) = f (B) + f (K ({x})).
By selection of singletons, f (K ({x})) = x. Thus, f (B + x) = f (B) + x.
2.3 Multi-utilitarianism
We now define the set of rules which will be the focus of our study. Let λ ∈ [0, 1]. For
λ 6= 1/2, define the λ-utilitarian rule Uλ : B → R2 as follows: for all B ∈ B,
Uλ (B) ≡
½
y ∈ H (B) : λy1 + (1− λ) y2 = sup
x∈B
λx1 + (1− λ)x2
¾
.
Call this class of rules the weighted utilitarian rules. Clearly, a rule corresponding to
λ = 1/2 is not well-defined. In standard normative economics, the weighted utilitarian
rules select a feasible alternative which maximizes a weighted sum of agents’ utilities.
Here, such a rule is generally not eﬃcient. Thus, a weighted utilitarian rule specifies
an eﬃcient transfer which gives the same aggregate weighted utility as the maximal
aggregate weighted utility which is feasible before transfers. Figure 3 illustrates a typical
weighted utilitarian rule, here the point y ≡ Ux (B).
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BH(B)
(x,1-x)
y
Figure 3: A weighted utilitarian rule
A distinguishing feature of the quasilinear model is that the set of eﬃcient solutions is
convex for all problems. This feature allows us to construct many eﬃcient rules out of old
rules. Thus, let ν be a probability measure on the measurable space ([0, 1] \ {1/2} ,Σ),
where Σ are the Borel sets restricted to [0, 1] \ {1/2}. Define the ν-utilitarian rule
Uν : B→ R2 as follows: for all B ∈ B,
Uν (B) ≡
Z
[0,1]\{1/2}
Uλ (B) dν (λ) .
Call this class of rules the multi-utilitarian rules.
3 Results
3.1 The main result
The main result states that a rule satisfies the five properties if and only if it is a multi-
utilitarian rule.
Theorem 1: A rule satisfies eﬃciency, translation invariance, monotonicity, continuity,
and additivity if and only if it is a multi-utilitarian rule.
Theorem 1 is tight; we provide the independence of the axioms in the Appendix.
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3.2 A discussion of proof strategy
By translation invariance and continuity, we may restrict ourselves to the class of prob-
lems whose eﬃcient set consists of points whose aggregate utility is zero and which have
a unique eﬃcient utility pair. We can embed any such problem into the space of con-
tinuous functions on [0, 1]. Specifically, each such problem is uniquely determined by
the solutions recommended for each of the weighted utilitarian rules. Thus, for a given
problem B, Uλ (B) is a continuous function in λ (with the value for λ = 1/2 given
by H (B) ∩ B). We work on the space of continuous functions which are induced by
problems. We define an induced “rule” on this space of functions. It is easily verified
that this rule is additive and monotonic (and hence continuous in the sup-norm topol-
ogy). The rule may be extended to the linear hull of this class of functions, preserving
additivity and monotonicity. By using a lattice-theoretic version of the Hahn-Banach
theorem, we extend this monotonic functional to the entire space of continuous functions
on [0, 1] to obtain a monotonic linear functional. Applying the Riesz representation
theorem, we conclude that the rule on the space of continuous functions is represented
by integration with respect to a measure. Monotonicity guarantees that the measure
is positive, and translation invariance guarantees that it assigns measure one to [0, 1];
hence it is a probability measure. Translating back into the space of problems results in
a multi-utilitarian rule on the restricted class of problems. We then show how to extend
the characterization on this restricted class to the class of all problems. A similar proof
strategy is used in the work of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [4], in the context of choice
with unforeseen contingencies.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 1
We will not prove that a multi-utilitarian rule satisfies the axioms; this can be easily
verified. The opposite direction is proved below.
Proof: Step 1: Establishing the homogeneity of f.
We claim that for all B ∈ B and all α ≥ 0, f (αB) = αf (B). Let α ∈ Q. Then
α = m
n
for some m,n ∈ N. Let x = f
¡
1
n
B
¢
. Then by additivity, as B = n
¡
1
n
B
¢
,
nx = f (B). Therefore, f
¡
1
n
B
¢
= 1
n
f (B). By additivity, f
¡
m
n
B
¢
= m
n
f (B), so that
f (αB) = αf (B). The result obtains by the density of the rationals and continuity.
Step 2: Embedding rules and problems into the space of continuous func-
tions, and establishing properties on the induced functional.
Define B∗ ⊂ B to be the class of problems which have a single eﬃcient alternative.
Formally, B ∈ B∗ if H (B) ∩B is a singleton. Let B0 ⊂ B∗ so that B ∈ B0 if x (B) = 0.
Most of the work of the proof is done in B0.
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Let C ([0, 1]) be the class of continuous, real-valued functions defined on the unit
interval endowed with the sup-norm topology.
Define the function σ : B0 → C ([0, 1]) by σ (B) (λ) ≡ Uλ1 (B). It is easily verified
that for all B, σ (B) is a continuous function on [0, 1].
Moreover, σ is one-to-one between B0 and C ([0, 1]). It is a simple exercise to verify
that for all B,B0 ∈ B0, σ (B +B0) = σ (B) + σ (B0). Further, for all α ≥ 0 and all
B ∈ B0, σ (αB) = ασ (B). (These properties are easily verified, similarly to Rockafellar
[9], 16.4).
Moreover, B0 dominates B for agent 1 if and only if σ (B0) ≥ σ (B). To see this, let
B,B0 ∈ B0 such that B0 dominates B for agent 1. We will show that for all λ ∈ [0, 1/2],
σ (B0) (λ) ≥ σ (B) (λ). A symmetric argument will establish the proof for λ ∈ [1/2, 1].
Thus, let λ ∈ [0, 1/2]. Let
A0 ≡ B0 ∩ {x ∈ R+ : x2 ≥ sup {x2 : x ∈ B ∩H (B)}}
A ≡ B ∩ {x ∈ R+ : x2 ≥ sup {x2 : x ∈ B ∩H (B)}} .
As B0 dominates B for agent 1, A0 ⊂ A. Defining supx∈∅ f (x) as −∞, as A0 ⊂ A,
sup
x∈A0
λx1 + (1− λ)x2 ≤ sup
x∈A
λx1 + (1− λ)x2.
Let x∗ ≡ x ∈ H (B) such that x∗2 = sup {x2 : x ∈ B ∩H (B)}. We claim that for all
x ∈ B0\A0, λx1 + (1− λ)x2 ≤ λx∗1 + (1− λ)x∗2. Suppose that this statement is false, so
that there exists x ∈ B0\A0 such that λx1 + (1− λ)x2 > λx∗1 + (1− λ)x∗2. As x /∈ A0,
x2 ≤ x∗2. Thus,
λ (x1 − x∗1) > (1− λ) (x∗2 − x2) ,
where the right hand side is nonnegative, as λ < 1/2 and x2 ≤ x∗2. Conclude that
λ (x1 − x∗1) > 0; in particular, λ > 0, so that
x1 − x∗1 >
µ
1− λ
λ
¶
(x∗2 − x2) .
But
¡
1−λ
λ
¢
≥ 1, so that
x1 − x∗1 > x∗2 − x2,
and
x1 + x2 > x
∗
1 + x
∗
2,
contradicting the fact that H (B) = H (B0). It is then clear that
sup
x∈B0
λx1 + (1− λ)x2 ≤ max
½
sup
x∈A
λx1 + (1− λ)x2,λx∗1 + (1− λ)x∗2
¾
,
from which we conclude (using the fact that A ⊂ B and x∗ ∈ B)
sup
x∈B0
λx1 + (1− λ)x2 ≤ sup
x∈B
λx1 + (1− λ)x2.
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Next, we claim that for all λ < 1/2, Uλ1 (B) ≤ Uλ1 (B0) if and only if supx∈B0 λx1 +
(1− λ)x2 ≤ supx∈B λx1+(1− λ)x2. To this end, we need only establish that Uλ1 (B) ≤
Uλ1 (B
0) implies supx∈B0 λx1 + (1− λ) x2 ≤ supx∈B λx1 + (1− λ)x2 and that Uλ1 (B) <
Uλ1 (B
0) implies supx∈B0 λx1 + (1− λ)x2 < supx∈B λx1 + (1− λ)x2. We will show the
second statement; the first follows by replacing all strict inequalities by weak inequalities.
By definition,
λUλ1 (B
0) + (1− λ)
¡
−Uλ1 (B0)
¢
= sup
x∈B0
λx1 + (1− λ)x2
and
λUλ1 (B) + (1− λ)
¡
−Uλ1 (B)
¢
= sup
x∈B
λx1 + (1− λ) x2.
As λ < 1/2, λ
¡
Uλ1 (B
0)− Uλ1 (B)
¢
< (1− λ)
¡
Uλ1 (B
0)− Uλ1 (B)
¢
. Hence λUλ1 (B
0) +
(1− λ)
¡
−Uλ1 (B0)
¢
< λUλ1 (B) + (1− λ)
¡
−Uλ1 (B)
¢
.
Thus, for all λ < 1/2, we conclude that σ (B) (λ) ≤ σ (B0) (λ). The argument for
λ > 1/2 is symmetric. Lastly, the argument for λ = 1/2 follows from the fact that for
all λ 6= 1/2, σ (B) (λ) ≤ σ (B0) (λ), and since each of σ (B) and σ (B0) are continuous
functions.
Next, we show that if σ (B) ≤ σ (B0), then B0 dominates B for agent 1. So, let λ <
1/2. By the argument above, if σ (B) ≤ σ (B0), we conclude supx∈B0 λx1 + (1− λ)x2 ≤
supx∈B λx1 + (1− λ)x2. Suppose that there exists some y∗ ∈ B0 such that y∗2 ≥ x∗2 and
y∗ ∈ B0\B. We will derive a contradiction. By a version of the Separating Hyperplane
Theorem (Corollary 5.59 of Aliprantis and Border [1]), there exists a pair (λ, 1− λ) ∈ R2
such that λy∗1 + (1− λ) y∗2 > supx∈B λx1 + (1− λ)x2. We claim that λ ∈ [0, 1/2].
Clearly, λ ∈ [0, 1], or else the supremum over B does not exist. So, suppose that
λ > 1/2. In particular, λy∗1+(1− λ) y∗2 > λx∗1+(1− λ)x∗2, from which we conclude that
λ (y∗1 − x∗1) > (1− λ) (x∗2 − y∗2). As λ > 0, this implies that y∗1 − x∗1 >
¡
1−λ
λ
¢
(x∗2 − y∗2).
Next, as y∗2 > x
∗
2, and as
¡
1−λ
λ
¢
< 1, we conclude
¡
1−λ
λ
¢
(x∗2 − y∗2) > x∗2 − y∗2. Hence
y∗1−x∗1 > x∗2−y∗2, or y∗1+y∗2 > x∗1+x∗2, contradicting H (B) = H (B0) . Thus, λ ∈ [0, 1/2].
But then supx∈B0 λx1 + (1− λ)x2 ≥ λy∗1 + (1− λ) y∗2 > supx∈B λx1 + (1− λ)x2, so that
σ (B0) (λ) > σ (B) (λ), a contradiction.
Define T : σ (B0) → R as T (σ (B)) ≡ f1 (B). The function T is then additive and
homogeneous on σ (B0). As f is monotonic, then by the preceding statements, T is
monotonic, and hence continuous in the sup-norm topology.
Step 3: Extending the linear functional to the space of continuous func-
tions.
We extend T to a vector subspace of C ([0, 1]). Thus, let H ≡ {g − h : g, h ∈ σ (B0)}.
Clearly, H is now a vector subspace. Define T ∗ : H→ R by T ∗ (g − h) = T (g)− T (h).
We claim that T ∗ is well-defined, linear, and continuous. To see that it is well-defined,
suppose that g − h ∈ H can be written as g − h = g0 − h0. Thus, g + h0 = g0 + h.
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We conclude that T (g + h0) = T (g0 + h); moreover, by additivity of T , T (g + h0) =
T (g)+T (h0) and T (g0 + h) = T (g0)+T (h). Therefore, T (g)+T (h0) = T (g0)+T (h).
Hence, T (g) − T (h) = T (g0) − T (h0). Therefore, T ∗ is well-defined. As T is linear,
so is T ∗. As T is monotonic, T ∗ is monotonic. To see this, suppose that g − h ≥ 0.
Then T ∗ (g − h) = T (g)−T (h). Since g ≥ h, and as T is monotonic, T (g)−T (h) ≥ 0.
Hence T ∗ is monotonic, and hence continuous.
We extend T ∗ to all of C ([0, 1]). We can extend T ∗ to all of C ([0, 1]) so that the
extension is monotonic (Corollary III.9.12 of Conway [3], using the fact that 1 ∈ H,
where 1 = σ (K ({(1,−1)}))). We refer to this continuous linear extension as T ∗∗.
Step 4: Obtaining the measure representation of the rule for a restricted
class of problems.
By the Riesz representation theorem (for example, see Corollary 13.15 of Aliprantis
and Border [1]), there exists a countably additive measure ν on ([0, 1] ,Σ) such that
T ∗∗ (f) ≡
Z
[0,1]
f (λ) dν (λ) .
Further, ν is positive if T ∗∗ is monotonic.
We claim that for all c ∈ R, T ∗∗ (c) = c.5 It is clear by definition that
σ (K ({(c,−c)})) is the constant function c. Moreover, we know by selection of sin-
gletons that f (K ({(c,−c)})) = (c,−c). Thus, by definition of T , T (c) = c and
hence T ∗∗ (c) = c. As for all constant functions c, T ∗∗ (c) = c, we conclude that
T ∗∗ (c) = ν ([0, 1]) c = c, so that ν ([0, 1]) = 1.
By definition of T , for all B ∈ B0, f (B) = (T (σ (B)) ,−T (σ (B))) =³R
[0,1]
σ (B) (λ) dν (λ) ,−
R
[0,1]
σ (B) (λ) dν (λ)
´
. Rewriting,
f (B) =
Z
[0,1]
(σ (B) (λ) ,−σ (B) (λ)) dν (λ) .
For all λ, (σ (B) (λ) ,−σ (B) (λ)) = Uλ (B). Thus,
f (B) =
Z
[0,1]
Uλ (B) dν (λ) .
We show that this formula holds for all B ∈ B∗. Let B ∈ B∗ and let x satisfy
B + x ∈ B0.6 Then f (B + x) = R
[0,1]
Uλ (B + x) dν (λ). For all λ, Uλ is translation
invariant (it can easily be shown to hold for λ = 1/2), so that Uλ (B + x) = Uλ (B) + x.
5We abuse notation in a standard way by identifying a constant function with the value that constant
function takes.
6For example, let x = (−x (B) , 0).
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Hence f (B + x) =
R
[0,1]
¡
Uλ (B) + x
¢
dν (λ). As ν ([0, 1]) = 1, the preceding is equal toR
[0,1]
Uλ (B) dν (λ) + x. By translation invariance of f , f (B + x) = f (B) + x. Hence,
f (B) + x =
R
[0,1]
Uλ (B) dν (λ) + x, so that f (B) =
R
[0,1]
Uλ (B) dν (λ).
Step 5: Verifying that 1/2 has measure zero, and completing the charac-
terization.
We extend the representation to all of B. First, we establish that ν ({1/2}) =
0. Let {Bn},{B0n} ⊂ B be the following sequences of problems: for all n, Bn ≡
K ¡©¡1− 1
n
,−1
¢
, (0, 0)
ª¢
and B0n ≡ K
¡©
(1,−1) ,
¡
0,− 1
n
¢ª¢
. Then, note that each of Bn
and B0n converge to K ({(1,−1) , (0, 0)}) in the Hausdorﬀ topology. Thus, by continuity,
limn→∞ f (Bn) = limn→∞ f (B
0
n). In particular, we can identify each Bn and B
0
n with its
induced continuous function, σ (Bn) and σ (B0n). It is simple to verify that the sequence
σ (Bn) converges pointwise to
F (λ) ≡
½
0 for λ ≤ 1/2
1 for λ > 1/2
and that the sequence σ (B0n) converges pointwise to
F 0 (λ) ≡
½
0 for λ < 1/2
1 for λ ≥ 1/2 .
In particular,
lim
n→∞
Z
[0,1]
σ (Bn) (λ) dν (λ) = lim
n→∞
Z
[0,1]
σ (B0n) (λ) dν (λ) .
Each of σ (Bn) and σ (B0n) are bounded sequences; hence, we may apply the Lebesgue
dominated convergence theorem (for example, see Theorem 11.20 of Aliprantis and Bor-
der [1]). We conclude Z
[0,1]
F (λ) dν (λ) =
Z
[0,1]
F 0 (λ) dν (λ) .
Moreover,
R
[0,1]
F (λ) dν (λ) = ν ((1/2, 1]) and
R
[0,1]
F 0 (λ) dν (λ) = ν ([1/2, 1]). Thus
ν ((1/2, 1]) = ν ([1/2, 1]), or ν ({1/2}) = 0.
As the set B∗ is dense in B in the Hausdorﬀ topology, we establish that for all B ∈ B,
f (B) =
Z
[0,1]
Uλ (B) dν (λ) ,
independently of how U1/2 is defined. We may thus write
f (B) =
Z
[0,1]\{1/2}
Uλ (B) dν (λ) .
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3.4 A characterization on the basis of mixture linearity
We establish a characterization of a class of rules based on mixture linearity. Fix a
multi-utilitarian rule, Uν . Fix some exogenous transfer from agent 2 to agent 1, say, c.
For any problem B, such a rule recommends whatever is recommended by Uν, plus the
transfer from agent 2 to agent 1.
Corollary 1: A rule f satisfies eﬃciency, translation invariance, monotonicity, conti-
nuity, and mixture linearity if and only if there exist c ∈ R and a multi-utilitarian
rule Uν such that for all B ∈ B, f (B) = (c,−c) + Uν (B).
Proof: It is simple to verify that any such rule satisfies the axioms.
Conversely, let f be a rule satisfying the axioms. By eﬃciency, the sum of the
elements of f (K ({0})) is equal to zero. Thus, let (c,−c) ≡ f (K ({0})).
Let f∗ be the rule defined so that for all B ∈ B, f∗ (B) ≡ f (B) − (c,−c). Then it
is trivial to verify that f∗ satisfies the axioms listed in the hypothesis of the corollary.
Moreover, f∗ (K ({0})) = 0. Thus, by Proposition 2, we may conclude that f∗ is additive.
Hence f∗ is a multi-utilitarian rule, say Uν. Therefore, f (B) ≡ (c,−c) + Uν (B).
3.5 On Green’s Theorem and recursive invariance
Green’s theorem invokes all of the axioms we discuss (except for a weaker version of
monotonicity), in addition to the following. It states that if a solution for a problem is
determined by a rule, then adding this solution to the utility possibilities set should not
change the solution selected by the rule.
Recursive invariance: For all B ∈ B, f (K (B ∪ {f (B)})) = f (B).
Green attributes this axiom to Chun [2], although Chun never actually uses it in any
characterization. Together with a basic symmetry condition, Green characterizes a one-
parameter subset of the multi-utilitarian rules, which for lack of better terminology, we
call class G. Members of G are described as follows. Fix a parameter λ ∈ [0, 1/2). Let
νλ be the probability measure such that νλ ({λ}) = νλ ({1− λ}) = 1/2. The elements
of G are the multi-utilitarian rules corresponding to such probability measures.
We will show how to derive a result related to Green’s from ours as a corollary, without
using the symmetry axiom. The proof of Green’s main result relies on a beautiful
functional equations argument. Here, our argument is primarily measure-theoretic.
Define a generalization of Green’s rules as follows. Say a multi-utilitarian rule f is a
bi-utilitarian rule if its associated probability measure ν has a support of at most two
elements, one of which lies above 1/2 and the other of which lies below 1/2 (recall that the
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support of a probability measure is the intersection of all closed sets having probability
one).7 A bi-utilitarian rule need not place equal probability on each of the two weighted
utilitarian rules with which it is associated. In fact, it might place positive probability
on only one weighted utilitarian rule; such a rule is itself a weighted utilitarian rule. It
is clear that requiring symmetry will force a bi-utilitarian rule to be an element of G.
Corollary 2: A rule satisfies eﬃciency, translation invariance, monotonicity, continuity,
additivity, and recursive invariance if and only if it is a bi-utilitarian rule.
Proof: To show that a bi-utilitarian rule satisfies the axioms is simple. Conversely,
suppose f is a rule satisfying the six axioms. By means of contradiction, suppose that
f is not a bi-utilitarian rule. By Theorem 1, f is a multi-utilitarian rule. Let ν be the
probability measure associated with f . As f is not a bi-utilitarian rule, we may assume
without loss of generality that the support of ν contains more than one element which is
greater than 1/2.
We will show that the support of ν contains at most one point greater than 1/2. To
this end, suppose by means of contradiction that it contains at least two. Let λ∗ > 1/2
be an element in the support which is strictly less than the supremal element.
We now construct a problem which is the intersection of the hyperplanes in the direc-
tions (λ∗, 1− λ∗), (1, 0), and (0, 1). Thus, let B ≡ {x ∈ R2 : λ∗1x1 + (1− λ1)x∗2 ≤ 0} ∩
{x ∈ R2 : x1 ≤ 1} ∩ {x ∈ R2 : x2 ≤ 0}. Then for all λ ≤ λ∗, (including λ < 1/2),
Uλ (B) = 0, and for all λ > λ∗, Uλ1 (B) > 0. As the support of ν contains points
which are greater than λ∗ (as λ∗ was less than the supremal element), we conclude
that Uν1 (B) > 0. In fact, there exists some λ
0 > λ∗ such that for all λ ∈ (1/2,λ0),
Uλ1 (K (B ∪ {Uν (B)})) = Uν1 (B) > Uλ1 (B). For all other λ, Uλ (K (B ∪ {Uν (B)})) =
Uλ (B). The set (1/2,λ0) has positive measure according to ν, so that this implies
Uν1 (K (B ∪ {Uν (B)})) > Uν1 (B). This is a contradiction to recursive invariance.
3.6 On strongly monotonic multi-utilitarian rules
A natural question is whether or not there are interesting multi-utilitarian rules which
do not belong to G. The following axiom, which is a strengthening of monotonicity, is
violated by all members of G.
Strong monotonicity: Let B,B0 ∈ B and suppose that B0 dominates B for agent 1
and that B 6= B0. Then f1 (B) < f1 (B0).
7An important feature of the definition of a bi-utilitarian rule is that there can be at most one
weighted utilitarian rule favoring agent 1 and at most one favoring agent 2. In other words, it cannot
put support on two weighted utilitarian rules, each of which favor agent 1. This is not indicated in the
simple terminology “bi-utilitarian.”
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Multi-utilitarian rules satisfying strong monotonicity exist, and in fact a characteri-
zation of this family is possible. We demonstrate that a multi-utilitarian rule satisfies
strong monotonicity if and only if the associated probability measure has a support
of [0, 1] \ {1/2} in the relative topology on [0, 1] \ {1/2}. Say a rule is a full multi-
utilitarian rule if it is a multi-utilitarian rule whose associated probability measure has
full support.
Corollary 3: A rule satisfies eﬃciency, translation invariance, strong monotonicity, con-
tinuity, and additivity if and only if it is a full multi-utilitarian rule.
Proof: It is simple to show that a full multi-utilitarian rule satisfies strong mono-
tonicity.
We prove the other direction. Let f be a rule satisfying the five axioms listed in
the theorem. Strong monotonicity implies monotonicity, so by Theorem 1, f is a multi-
utilitarian rule. Let ν be the probability measure associated with f . It is enough to show
that for all open intervals (λ1,λ2) with λ1 < λ2, which do not include 1/2, ν ((λ1,λ2)) > 0.
Let (λ1,λ2) be such an interval, and without loss of generality, suppose that λ1 > 1/2.
We construct two problems, B0 and B. Let
B0 ≡
©
x ∈ R2 : λ1x1 + (1− λ1)x2 ≤ 0
ª
∩
©
x ∈ R2 : λ2x1 + (1− λ2)x2 ≤ 0
ª
∩
©
x ∈ R2 : x1 ≤ 1
ª
∩
©
x ∈ R2 : x2 ≤ 1
ª
.
Let B ≡ K
³n³
1, λ1−1
λ1
´
,
³
λ2−1
λ2
, 1
´o´
. The problem B0 is the convex, comprehensive
hull of B with the origin. The important point (which is also easily verified) is that
B0 dominates B for agent 1 and for all λ /∈ (λ1,λ2), Uλ (B) = Uλ (B0). By strong
monotonicity, f1 (B
0) > f1 (B). Thus, by definition of f ,Z
[0,1]\{1/2}
Uλ1 (B
0) dν (λ) >
Z
[0,1]\{1/2}
Uλ1 (B) dν (λ) .
Rewriting, Z
[0,1]\{1/2}
Uλ1 (B
0)− Uλ1 (B) dν (λ) > 0,
and as for all λ /∈ (λ1,λ2), Uλ (B) = Uλ (B0), concludeZ
(λ1,λ2)
Uλ1 (B
0)− Uλ1 (B) dν (λ) > 0,
establishing that ν ((λ1,λ2)) > 0. Thus f is a full multi-utilitarian rule.
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4 Conclusion
A last point that bears mentioning: Green discusses a strengthening of continuity which
involves the “bounded convergence topology.” A sequence {Bn} converges to B in
the bounded convergence topology if and only if for all compact sets K, K ∩ Bn con-
verges to K ∩ B. Continuity with respect to the bounded convergence topology is
stronger than continuity with respect to the Hausdorﬀ topology; for example, the se-
quence K ({(0, 0) , (1,−n)}) converges to K ({(0, 0)}) as n→∞ in the bounded conver-
gence topology, but not in the Hausdorﬀ topology. Strengthening continuity in Theorem
1 in this sense results in the additional implication that ν ({0}) = ν ({1}) = 0.
Extending the families of rules characterized in this work to environments involving
many agents is the subject of ongoing research.
5 Appendix: On the independence of the axioms in
Theorem 1
In this Appendix, for each axiom used in the characterization provided in Theorem 1, we
provide an example of a rule (or family of rules) which violates this axiom, yet satisfies
the remaining axioms of Theorem 1.
Example 1: A rule that satisfies translation invariance, monotonicity, continuity, and
additivity but not eﬃciency. Let f (B) ≡ U0 (B) ∧ U1 (B). As is stated in the
text, monotonicity has a parallel statement for agent 2 (which is equivalent to
the original statement of monotonicity under the eﬃciency axiom). The rule f
satisfies the alternative version of monotonicity.
Example 2: A rule that satisfies eﬃciency, monotonicity, continuity, and additivity but
not translation invariance. Let f (B) be the point of equal coordinates on H (B).
Thus, x = f (B) if and only if x1 = x2 and x ∈ H (B).
Example 3: A rule that satisfies eﬃciency, translation invariance, continuity, and addi-
tivity but not monotonicity. This class of rules can be characterized (by strength-
ening continuity to Lipschitz continuity), and we will call them the generalized
multi-utilitarian rules. Formally, let ν be a countably additive signed measure
of bounded variation on ([0, 1] \ {1/2} ,Σ) satisfying ν ([0, 1] \ {1/2}) = 1. Define
Uνsuch that for all B ∈ B,
Uν (B) ≡
Z
[0,1]\{1/2}
Uλ (B) dν (λ) .
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Example 4: A rule that satisfies eﬃciency, translation invariance, monotonicity, addi-
tivity but not continuity. An example of this type was already provided in the
text. For another example, give agent 1 his supremal utility in the eﬃcient set:
f (B) ≡
n
x ∈ H (B) : x1 ≥ y1 for all y ∈ H (B)
o
.
Example 5: A rule that satisfies eﬃciency, translation invariance, monotonicity, and
continuity but not additivity. This is perhaps the easiest example to think of. A
simple example, inspired by the decision theory literature (see Gilboa and Schmei-
dler [5]) is the following. Let Π be a convex and weak∗ compact set of Borel
probability measures over [0, 1] \ {1, 2}. Define
f (B) ≡
µ
min
p∈Π
Z
[0,1]\{1/2}
Uλ1 (B) dp (λ) , x (B)−min
p∈Π
Z
[0,1]\{1/2}
Uλ1 (B) dp (λ)
¶
.
Then this rule satisfies all of the axioms but additivity.
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